Compliance, informality and contributive pensions by Leroux, Marie-Louise et al.
Available at:
http://hdl.handle.net/2078.1/171210
[Downloaded 2019/04/19 at 00:14:02 ]
"Compliance, informality and contributive pensions"
Leroux, Marie-Louise ; Maldonado, Dario ; Pestieau, Pierre
Abstract
We consider a political economy model in which agents have the possibility to
hide part of their earnings in order to avoid taxation. Taxation is exclusively
used to finance a pension system. If the pension system is implemented, agents
in their old age receive a benefit which includes both a Bismarkian and a
Beveridgian component. We show that in the absence of compliance costs,
agents are indifferent to the tax rate level as in response, they can perfectly
adapt their level of compliance. The public pension system is found to be at least
partially contributory in order to increase compliance and thus to increase the
tax base. When compliance costs are introduced, perfect substitutability between
compliance and taxation breaks down. Depending on the relative returns from
public pensions and private savings as well as on the elasticity of compliance to
income, we obtain that the preferred tax rate should be increasing or decreasing
in income. The majority voting tax rate is more like...
Document type : Document de travail (Working Paper)
Référence bibliographique
Leroux, Marie-Louise ; Maldonado, Dario ; Pestieau, Pierre. Compliance, informality and
contributive pensions. CORE Discussion Papers ; 2015/55 (2015) 44 pages
 2015/55 
 
 
! 
 
 
 
Compliance, informality and contributive pensions 
 
Marie-Louise Leroux, Dario Maldonado, Pierre Pestieau!
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CORE 
Voie du Roman Pays 34, L1.03.01 
B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium. 
Tel (32 10) 47 43 04 
Fax (32 10) 47 43 01 
E-mail: immaq-library@uclouvain.be 
http://www.uclouvain.be/en-44508.html!
CORE DISCUSSION PAPER   
2015/55 
 
Compliance, informality and contributive pensionsa 
 
Marie-Louise Lerouxb, Dario Maldonadoc, Pierre Pestieaud 
 
December 2, 2015 
 
 
Abstract 
 
We consider a political economy model in which agents have the possibility to 
hide part of their earnings in order to avoid taxation. Taxation is exclusively 
used to finance a pension system. If the pension system is implemented, agents 
in their old age receive a benefit which includes both a Bismarkian and a 
Beveridgian component. We show that in the absence of compliance costs, 
agents are indifferent to the tax rate level as in response, they can perfectly 
adapt their level of compliance. The public pension system is found to be at 
least partially contributory in order to increase compliance and thus to increase 
the tax base. When compliance costs are introduced, perfect substitutability 
between compliance and taxation breaks down. Depending on the relative 
returns from public pensions and private savings as well as on the elasticity of 
compliance to income, we obtain that the preferred tax rate should be increasing 
or decreasing in income. The majority voting tax rate is more likely to be 
positive when the median income is low and when the return from public 
pensions dominates that of private savings. The level of the Bismarkian pillar 
will now be chosen so as to account for increased political support, for 
increased direct redistribution toward the worst-off agent, and increased tax 
base. 
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1 Introduction
Tax evasion is endemic in many countries, in particular in developing countries, which do not col-
lect even half of what they should if taxpayers complied with the written letter of the law (Moore
and Mascagni, 2014). In these countries, enforcement mechanisms are weak, tax-collecting au-
thorities are held in low esteem, and courts may not enforce the rules. Many developing countries
still face tax shares of GDP below 15% which is considered as a reasonable threshold for ensuring
government functioning. In recent years, domestic revenue mobilization in developing countries
has gained increasing prominence in the policy debate. This is due to several factors, includ-
ing the potential benefits of taxation for state building, long-term independence from foreign
assistance and the continuing acute financial needs of developing countries.
Plenty of specific solutions to how boosting compliance have been oﬀered in the literature and
public authorities have tried many more. Increasing and better focused enforcement, improving
the collection and management of information, reducing the costs of complying with the law,
providing incentives for those who comply, and modifying tax bases and rates are some of the
obvious examples. Another solution consists in sending messages to taxpayers so as to aﬀect their
behavior and increase compliance. These messages supposedly operate on the beliefs and moral
values that people attach to paying taxes. Related to this issue, the recent paper by Castro and
Scartascini (2013) explores the impact of the use of messages for aﬀecting taxpayers’ compliance
by conducting a large-scale field experiment in Argentina. Another alternative solution is to
focus on firms that choose to make use of the financial sector. As argued by Gordon and Li
(2009) bank records allow governments to identify taxable entities and to measure the amount
of their taxable activity. Finally, another possible solution consists in establishing a close link
between the amount of taxes paid and the benefits obtained. After all, if that link were perfect
there would not be any problem of compliance. The tax would play the same role as any market
price. Naturally, the link is often not perfect as the government is expected to provide public
goods and redistribute income. This is the avenue of research this paper explores.
Unlike most of the literature on taxation in developing countries that deals with capital
taxation and foreign duties, we focus in this paper on income and payroll taxation.1 In particular,
we are interested in studying how a government that uses the pension system to redistribute
towards the olds and the poors must design it when it faces evasion and political restrictions
1See for instance Martinez-Vasquez and Alm (2003).
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on the tax rate. To study this issue, we use a model where the level of taxation is chosen by
majority voting and where, in addition, non compliance is possible but costly. Since we focus on
developing countries where tax enforcement mechanisms are very weak, our model is diﬀerent
from the traditional literature where the taxpayer faces a probability of detection and pays
some penalty if evasion is detected (e.g. Allingham and Sandmo, 1972). Instead, individuals
receive direct benefits from tax payments so that it may be in their interest to contribute. This
can be done in several ways but in essence what one needs is a model where the proceeds of
taxation are spent in private or semi-private goods which are not perfect substitutes to standard
consumption. Examples of such goods are health care, education or housing, granted that these
services are essential to the individuals’ welfare. In this paper we choose the example of public
pensions when claimed benefits depend on individual payments. Pension benefits are essential to
the individuals and have poor substitutes in the private sector. The reason for this is the absence
of private annuity markets and the ineﬃciency of the financial sector. In the introduction of a
pension system we follow the model initiated by Casamatta et al. (2000a,b).
We consider a society where individuals live for two periods, a first-period of activity and a
second-period of retirement. They only diﬀer in income. In the first period, they choose how
much income to report to fiscal authorities and pay a tax on this amount so as to finance the
pension system. They further allocate their income net of tax between current consumption
and saving. Depending on their income and thus on whether they are liquidity constrained,
individuals save or not. This will also depend on the existence and the level of compliance costs
incurred in the first period, that is at the time of paying taxes.2 The period of retirement is
uncertain as a fraction of individuals do not survive after the first period. In this second period,
individuals’ consumption is financed by the proceeds of saving and by the public pension. As
in Casamatta et al. (2000a,b) this pension benefit depends on two components. The first one is
proportional to their reported labor income; the factor of proportionality is called the Bismarkian
factor. The second component, the Beveridgian paart, is common to all individuals and depends
on average tax collection. We assume that agents vote over the level of the tax rate and that the
Bismarkian factor is set constitutionally, prior to any vote over the tax rate, so as to maximize
the utility of the poorest agent (Rawlsian Social Welfare Function).
To better understand the (main) model with compliance costs, we proceed by steps and first
2Our model can also be seen as a reduced form of the Allingham and Sandmo (1972) model with non proba-
bilistic compliance and a convex cost function of the unreported income.
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introduce simple models where 1) compliance is so costly that everyone chooses to comply and
2) there is no compliance cost.
We obtain the following results. Without compliance cost, agents prefer to comply (at least
partially) with the tax system as soon as they obtain a higher marginal return from the pension
system than from the private saving system (which is close to the case of developing countries
where financial markets are thin and very ineﬃcient). Interestingly, in such a case, choosing how
much income to report or choosing the level of the tax rate are perfectly equivalent decisions so
that the agents are indiﬀerent as to the level of the tax rate chosen at the voting equilibrium. The
reason is that they are perfectly able to adapt their level of compliance following a variation in
the tax rate so as to keep unchanged the amount of resources they want to transfer for their old
age. We find that it is always optimal to have a contributory pension system, as increasing the
degree of contribution makes the agents willing to report more income and thus it increases the
resources collected and distributed through the flat pension benefit part (which mainly benefits
low-income agents). The reason for a contributive pension system is therefore diﬀerent from
that in Casamatta et al. (2000a). Here, increasing the Bismarkian factor increases the tax base.
Whenever we introduce a cost of compliance, we now find that agents will always choose
to report at least some fraction of their income, independently of the returns from savings and
from the pension system. Under some circumstances (for example when the return from pension
contributions is higher than that of private savings or if labour income is high), it may even be
the case that agents fully comply. Agents will now choose to save only if they are not liquidity
constrained, that is for a suﬃciently high-income level. Also, the introduction of a compliance
cost breaks down perfect substitutability between the tax rate and the amount reported to fiscal
authorities so that the agent’s preferred tax rate now depends on his income, and on the relative
returns from pension contributions and from savings. As a consequence, the variation of this
tax rate with income depends on these relative returns as well as on the elasticity of compliance
with respect to income. In addition, we find that if the marginal return from public pensions is
higher than that of private savings and if the agent’s income is relatively high, this agent votes
for a tax rate that lies on the decreasing part of the Laﬀer curve. The intuition is simply that
he would like to use the public system rather than private savings to transfer resources to the
old age and to report even more than his full income. As he cannot do so, he votes for a tax
rate that is greater than the top of the Laﬀer curve, even if it is at the expense of lower collected
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resources and of a lower flat pension benefit.
At any rate, the majority voting tax rate corresponds to the preferred tax rate of the median
agent and it is in general strictly positive. It is more likely to be the case whenever the median
voter has a relatively small income and when the return from pensions is greater than that from
savings. Therefore, in developing countries where such conditions are more likely to be satisfied,
making agents vote over the existence of a public pension system would favor the emergence
of such system and would push individuals to report at least a fraction (or even all) of their
income, since the contributory part of the pension benefit guarantees that they receive some
resources at a relatively high return in the second period.
Finally, we find that, even though at the constitutional stage, the objective of the government
is to maximize the utility of the least-favored agents, the Bismarkian factor should in general
be positive. This is so so as to both increase the support for the pension system, and increase
the level of the flat pension benefit, through a larger tax base. Although it may seem obvious,
this second reason is new in the literature.
This paper at least in its first part is about a particular type of voluntary tax. Voluntary
taxation defined as a contribution paid without any type of formal enforcement is an old issue
in economics. There are several types of potential voluntary taxes. The first one is the so-called
private contribution to a public good, which has been largely studied in the literature, with
the standard outcome of under provision and thus of insuﬃcient taxation (see Bergstrom et al.
1986). Another type of voluntary taxation appears when a tax can easily be avoided. This is for
instance, the case of estate taxation dubbed as “the tax for stupid” as it can be easily avoided
and it is stupid not to do so. The problem with this type of tax is that it introduces horizontal
inequity as people contribution depends on how they value citizenship. In fact, most taxes are
to a certain extent voluntary. As noted by Slemrod (1998), for most taxes we face a puzzle:
we need to explain why people pay taxes as, in the context of the standard economic model,
people should not voluntarily comply. They thus seem to exhibit nothing short of “pathological
honesty”. In our paper, we do not have any public good per se and individuals are purely
individualistic. In the absence of eﬀective compliance control, the only reason they pay taxes is
because it implies a benefit they could not obtain privately.
In addition, our paper can be related to the work on tax evasion such as the paper by Borck
(2009), who studies a political economy model of income redistribution where agents have the
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possibility to evade income. He shows that in such a case, redistribution may go from the middle
class to the rich and poor. It is diﬀerent from our paper in several respects. First, in his paper,
agents are risk neutral so that they either avoid all their income or none of it. Second, it assumes
that agents get a uniform transfer from their contributions while we model a pension system
that includes both a contributory and a redistributive part. Third, his model is one in which
the only motive for taxation is redistribution and there is no consumption smoothing motive
as in our model with pensions. Another paper by Borck (2004) shows how stricter enforcement
policies on tax evasion may actually increase tax evasion. Again, his model is diﬀerent from ours
mainly because the tax paid serves to finance a lump sum transfer and second, because evasion
entails a cost only if the agent is audited (in our model, the cost of evasion is non probabilistic).3
Traxler (2012) also looks at the eﬃciency eﬀect of tax avoidance when the rate is chosen by a
majority of taxpayers. His main finding is that the traditional ineﬃciency carried by majority
voting decreases with the extent of tax avoidance. Also, Alm et al. (1999) briefly discuss a
political economy model with risk neutral agents where the presence of a social norm influences
the tax compliance behaviour of agents and thus their voting behaviour over the increase in tax
rate, in the amount of fine and in the probability of detection.4 This model is diﬀerent from ours
at least in three dimensions: agents either fully comply or not at all, they receive a lump sum
benefit in exchange of their previous contributions and, the heterogeneity in this society arises
from individual diﬀerences in the psychological loss from not complying. Finally, the paper
of Kopczuk (2001) studies the optimal income taxation scheme when agents have diﬀerent tax
avoidance behaviour, either because they have diﬀerent preferences for avoidance or because of
diﬀerent avoidance cost functions. This is diﬀerent from our paper first because it is normative
and second, because in our model agents only diﬀer with respect to income. To the best of our
knowledge, our paper is one of the few political economy papers which look at the possibility of
collecting taxes and at the existence of a pension system when individuals are free to hide part
or the entirety of their earnings.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the assumptions
and the benchmark model in which every agents fully comply with the tax system. Section 3
presents a model where agents are free to report their income and where there is no compliance
3See also the survey by Borck (2007) on inequality, redistribution and taxation in political economy models.
4Their paper is mainly experimental. They show in particular that “when the group rejects any attempt to
raise the level of enforcement, compliance always falls, often collapsing to zero”. Also cheap talk helps increasing
compliance and may change the result of the vote in favour of paying more taxes.
5
cost. In Section 4, such costs are introduced. A final section is devoted to concluding remarks.
2 The model
2.1 Assumptions
We assume a two-period model, with a mass one of individuals who face uncertain survival.
Agents have diﬀerent productivity, y which is continuously distributed over [ymin, ymax], with
median productivity below the average one, ym < y¯, and a density function denoted by f(y).
In the first period, agents are working and supply inelastically one unit of labour. They also
consume and save on private markets. In the second period, say old-age, they are alive with a
probability 0 ≤ π ≤ 1. If alive, they are retired and consume a pension benefit and their savings.
Agents derive utility from consumption in each period. Without loss of generality, we assume
that there are no pure time preferences. Expected utility is written as follows:
u(c) + πu(d).
Per period utility is such that u￿(.) > 0, u￿￿(.) < 0 and u￿(0)→ +∞. We also make the following
assumption regarding the coeﬃcients of relative risk aversion, Rr(c) = −u￿￿(c)c/u￿(c):
A1: Rr(c) = Rr(d) ≤ 1.
To pay for consumption individuals use their disposable income (labor income minus taxes)
and their pension benefits. In the first period, agents pay a tax at rate τ on their reported
income so as to finance the public pension program.5 The proceeds of taxation are only used
to fund the pension system. In the second period, individuals receive a pension benefit which is
obtained from balancing the government’s budget and it is equal to:
P (τ,α; y) =
τ
π
(αy˜ + (1− α)E(y˜))
where α is the Bismarckian factor and it is set at the constitutional level. The pension benefit
is constituted of two parts as in Casamatta et al. (2000a). The first part (ταy˜/π) which we
call the Bismarkian part, is directly related to the agent’s contribution. The second Beveridgian
part, (τ(1 − α)E(y˜)/π) is flat and depends on average earnings in the economy. The variable
y˜ denotes the income reported by an agent with income y and E(y˜) is the expected reported
5We therefore assume that the government only imperfectly observes the distribution of incomes in the society
and/ or lacks coercive measures to make agents report their true income.
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earnings in the economy. For simplicity, we assume that the reported income is simply equal to
a fraction of the agent’s true income, so that y˜ = γy where 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1 is the rate of compliance
and it is privately chosen by the agent. As a consequence,
E(y˜) = E(γ(y)y) =
￿ ymax
ymin
γ(y)yf(y)dy.
For future reference, we also define here the flat pension benefit part as b(τ,α) and it is equal
to (1− α)τE(y˜)/π.
First and second-period consumptions are thus respectively equal to:
c = y − τ y˜ − s = (1− τγ)y − s
d =
ε
π
s+
τ
π
(αγy + (1− α)E(y˜))
where s is the amount of savings which is assumed to be invested on the private annuity market.
The agent can thus transfer resources across periods by both contributing to the pension system
and investing in a private annuity market. For simplicity, we assume that the interest rate
is null. The parameter 0 ≤ ε ≤ 1 reflects both the weakness of the annuity market and the
ineﬃciency of the financial institutions for individual savers.6 Therefore the marginal return the
agent obtains from buying private annuities is equal to ε/π while that of contributing to the
pension system is α/π. We make no specific assumption regarding the relative levels of α and ε
and will study the diﬀerent cases depending on whether α ≷ ε.
The timing of the model is the following. First, the government sets how contributive the
pension system should be, that is the level of the Bismarkian factor, α. Agents then vote over
the level of the tax rate that will finance the pension system. Finally, given the tax rate chosen
at the majority voting equilibrium, they decide how much to comply with the tax system, that
is the fraction of income to report, and how much to save. As usual in this type of problem,
we proceed backward. We first find the optimal individual decisions in terms of savings and
of compliance for given (τ,α) parameters. We then find the majority-voting tax rate, given
individual preferences over this tax rate and for a given α. We finally set α assuming that the
government is Rawlsian and thus maximizes the utility of the worst-oﬀ agent.
6If there was no private annuity market but if the individual could save at the current interest rate (here
assumed to be zero), ε would simply be equal to π and the return from saving would be 1.
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2.2 The benchmark model
In the next sections of this paper, we will focus on two cases: one where complying is costless
and one where not complying entails some (monetary) costs. To the contrary, in this section,
we will start by looking at a situation where individual incomes are publicly observable, in other
words, where full reporting is unavoidable. This can be seen as a case with extremely high
compliance costs. In this simple model, an agent with income y solves the following problem:7
max
s,τ
U(s; y) = u((1− τ)y − s) + πu( τ
π
(αy + (1− α)y¯) + εs
π
) (1)
where implicitly γ = 1. From the first order conditions of this problem, we find that this agent
either saves s∗(α; y) on private markets or votes for a positive tax rate τ∗(α; y) depending on
whether α ≷ ε. If the marginal return from pensions is lower than that of private savings, α < ε,
agents rely exclusively on private savings and vote in favour of a zero tax rate. To the opposite,
if α ≥ ε, agents prefer public pensions over private savings and s∗(α; y) = 0. In the following,
we concentrate on this latter case as this is the only one that guarantees the emergence of a
pension system.
In this case, the agent’s preferred tax rate τ∗(α; y) satisfies u￿(c) = αu￿(d).8 Using the
implicit function theorem and assumption A1, we obtain that dτ∗(α; y)/dy > 0: agents with
higher incomes are willing to transfer more resources to old-age than those with lower incomes
so as to smooth their consumption. Also, under A1, namely under the assumption that c and d
are complements, dτ∗(α; y)/dα > 0 for every agent independently of y. In that case, low-income
individuals benefit from a contributive scheme that guarantees them a suﬃciently wide tax base
while high-income agents always prefer a less redistributive pension system (i.e. a higher α).
Let us determine the voting equilibrium in this simple setting. Preferences are single-peaked
so that the majority voting equilibrium corresponds to the preferred tax rate of the agent with
median income, τV (α) = τ∗(α; ym) > 0.
Finally, we determine the optimal level for the contribution rate, αR. The social planner is
assumed to be Rawlsian so that he seeks to maximize the utility of the worst-oﬀ agent, i.e. the
7Usually this problem is solved in two steps, by first finding the individual decisions for given pension pa-
rameters and second, by determining the agent’s preferred tax rate given previous individual decisions. Since
preferences are identical in these two decision problems, we can solve it simultaneously without changing the
results.
8Under the assumption that u￿(0)→∞, the preferred tax rate is always strictly positive.
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one with minimum income ymin. It therefore satisfies the following first order condition:
∂V (α; ymin)
∂α
= [αu￿(d)− u￿(c)]ymindτ
V (α)
α
+ (ymin − y¯)τV (α)u￿(d) + (1− α)y¯u￿(d)dτ
V (α)
α
≤ 0 (2)
where V (α; y) is the indirect utility function of an individual with income y. Since the agent with
minimum income would like a smaller tax rate than the tax rate chosen at the voting equilibrium,
τ∗(α; ymin) < τV (α) = τ∗(α; ym), the first term, which is evaluated at (τV (α), ymin), in the
expression above is negative. This is due to the fact that increasing α increases the majority
voting tax rate and thus, constrain the agent with the lowest income to transfer too many
resources to the old age. He thus would like a smaller Bismarkian factor. The second term is
also negative and this is related to the fact that every agent with income below y¯ obtains more
from the pension system when it becomes more Beveridgian. Indeed, with the form of pension
benefit P (τ,α; y) considered here, any agent with y < y¯ is a net beneficiary from the pension
system as his expected benefit τ [αy+(1−α)y¯] exceeds his total contributions, τy and increases
when α decreases. The last term to the contrary is positive and is related to the support for the
pension system. One needs to make it at least partially contributive and thus less redistributive
than optimal so as to ensure higher political support.9 Adding up these terms we find that,
when the public scheme prevails (α ≥ ε), a positive Bismarckian factor, αR ∈ [ε, 1] is desirable
from the viewpoint of the worst oﬀ.
3 A compliance-choice model with no cost of compliance
3.1 Individual decisions
We now turn to a model where individuals decide both how much to save on private markets
and how much income to report. This in turn determines the size of the pension benefit they
receive in the second period and the amount of resources left for consumption in each period.
We assume for the moment that not complying does not entail any (moral or financial) cost as
well as no risk.
For given pension parameters (τ,α), the problem of an agent with income y consists in
solving
max
s,γ
U(γ, s; y) = u((1− γτ)y − s) + πu( τ
π
(αγy + (1− α)E(y˜)) + εs
π
) (3)
9This result is identical to that of Casamatta et al. (2000b).
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First order conditions of this problem are:
∂U
∂s
= −u￿(c) + εu￿(d) ≤ 0 (4)
∂U
∂γ
= τy[−u￿(c) + αu￿(d)] ≤ 0 (5)
These equations allow to obtain the optimal savings level and the proportion of income reported
by individuals. These will depend on α, τ and y. Let these functions be γ∗(τ,α; y) and s∗(τ,α; y).
Whether agents choose to save on private markets or to comply (which is equivalent to
preferring public pensions over private savings) only depends on the comparison between the
marginal returns from savings (ε/π) and from pensions (α/π). According to the above first order
conditions, they never choose both to report some income and to save; they either save on private
markets or comply (at least partially) with the public pension system. This result is independent
from their income and depends only on economic and institutional parameters. If α < ε, all
agents prefer private savings to public pensions, γ∗(τ,α; y) = 0∀y and s∗(τ,α; y) > 0 under the
assumption that u￿(0) → +∞. In such a case, the pension benefit P (τ,α; y) is obviously nil
since nobody ever comply. If on the contrary α ≥ ε, all agents prefer public pensions to private
savings: s∗(τ,α; y) = 0 and γ∗(τ,α; y) ≥ 0. In the rest of this section, we will thus concentrate
on the case where α ≥ ε as it is a necessary condition for the emergence of a pension system.
To anticipate on the results of the next section, as soon as we introduce compliance costs, this
condition is not necessary anymore and a pension system can emerge even when α < ε.
When α ≥ ε, some agents may still choose γ∗(τ,α; y) = 0 and rely exclusively on the flat
pension benefit b(τ,α) = (1−α)E(y˜)τ/π in their old age. This is the case for agents with income
y such that
∂U
∂γ
|γ=0= τy[αu￿((1− α)E(y˜) τ
π
)− u￿(y)] < 0.
From this, we can define a threshold productivity, yˆ(τ,α) which satisfies
u￿(yˆ(τ,α)) = αu￿((1− α)E(y˜) τ
π
) (6)
and such that, under u￿￿(.) < 0, every agents with y ≤ yˆ(τ,α) prefer γ∗(τ,α; y) = 0 while those
with y > yˆ(τ,α) prefer a strictly positive γ∗ = γ∗(τ,α; y) satisfying
u￿((1− τγ∗)y) = αu￿( τ
π
(αγ∗y + (1− α)E(y˜))). (7)
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Also, from now on and so as to ensure that γ∗(τ,α; y) ≤ 1, we assume that for each agent, the
tax rate chosen in equilibrium is at least equal to τ¯(α; y) defined by:10
u￿((1− τ¯)y) = αu￿( τ¯
π
(αy + (1− α)E(y˜))). (8)
This tax rate τ¯(α; y) then corresponds to the minimum tax rate level which generates full
compliance for an agent with income y. Under A1, τ¯(α; y) is increasing in y so that in the rest
of this section, we make the simplifying assumption that the tax rate chosen in equilibrium is
at least equal to τ¯(α; ymax) which ensures that γ∗(τ,α; y) ≤ 1 ∀y.11
When τ > τ¯(α; ymax), agents choose to comply only if they expect to obtain a suﬃciently
high marginal return from public pensions. This depends both on their income and on the
parameters of the pension system. If their income is small, below yˆ(τ,α), marginal utility from
consumption in the first period is high so that the marginal utility cost of reporting income
in the first period is always higher than the marginal utility benefit they obtain from previous
contributions in the second period. In the same way, if for instance, α = 0, the system is
fully redistributive so that increasing the rate of compliance, γ only entails a marginal utility
cost in the first period but no additional benefit in the second one (agents cannot aﬀect their
pension benefit by reporting more). With a Beveridgian system, every agent then prefers to
report nothing, γ∗(τ, 0; y) = 0 ∀y. On the contrary, if α = 1, the system is fully contributive
and every agent chooses to report a fraction γ∗(τ, 1; y) = 1τ
π
1+π ∀y, which corresponds to the
level of compliance that perfectly smoothes consumption across periods.12 We come back on the
comparative statics of γ∗(τ,α; y) at the end of this section.
We summarize our findings in the following proposition:
Proposition 1 Assume a population of agents with income y ∈ [ymin, ymax] who have the pos-
sibility to save on private markets and to choose the fraction of income they wish to report so
as to finance a public pension system. In the absence of evasion costs,
• If α < ε, every agents prefer private savings over the public pension system, so that
γ∗(τ,α; y) = 0 and s∗(τ,α; y) > 0 ∀y.
10This condition is obtained by evaluating equation (??) at γ = 1. For ease of notation, we have dropped the
arguments of τ¯ in (??).
11Relaxing this assumption would add additional mathematical complexities to our model. In particular, agents
may have diﬀerent preferences for the tax rate but, more importantly, for some agents (with a high income)
preferences may not be single-peaked so that the median voter theorem may not apply. As we will see, in the
section with compliance costs, we will not face this problem and we will have instead conditions on income levels.
12Note that when α = 1, if π=1, the “eﬀective” tax rate γτ is equal to 1/2, the top of the Laﬀer curve.
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• If α ≥ ε, no agent ever saves on private markets. Agents with income y ≤ yˆ(τ,α) do
not report any income and rely exclusively on the Beveridgian part of the pension benefit.
Agents with income y > yˆ(τ,α) report at least a fraction 0 < γ∗(τ,α; y) ≤ 1 and receive a
pension benefit which includes both a contributive and a redistributive part.
Interestingly, in the case where α ≥ ε, we see that even if agents choose not to save on private
markets, they are nonetheless not all going to comply and be willing to contribute to the public
pension system. For any 0 ≤ α < 1, at least part of the benefit they receive is a lump sum,
which may be enough for them not to be willing to report any resources. On the contrary, if
the system is fully contributive and there is no flat pension benefit, i.e. α = 1, they will always
report some income.
Before going further, let us come back to the definition of our problem and show that choosing
γ for a given τ is equivalent to letting the agent choose his preferred eﬀective tax rate level. In
order to understand this, we make a change of variable and define t ∈ [0, 1] as the eﬀective rate
of taxation: t = γτ . With s = 0, the agent’s utility function (??) can be rewritten as:
U(t; y) = u((1− t)y) + πu( 1
π
(αty + (1− α)E(ty)))
Maximizing U(t; y) with respect to t yields the following first-order condition:
∂U(t; y)
∂t
= y[−u￿(c) + αu￿(d)] ≤ 0 (9)
This optimality condition, which gives the optimal level t∗(α; y), is the same as the optimality
condition for γ∗(τ,α; y). Also, the threshold income below which agents prefer a zero eﬀective
tax rate t, yˆ(α) defined by
u￿(yˆ(α)) = αu￿
￿
(1− α)E(t
∗(α, y)y)
π
￿
(10)
with E(t∗(α, y)y) = τE(y˜) under our change of variable, exactly corresponds to the threshold
income below which agents decide not to report any income, yˆ(τ,α) (see equation ??). Hence,
the problem where an agent chooses his rate of compliance γ∗ for a given τ is exactly equivalent
to a problem where the agent chooses directly his preferred rate of contribution t∗, not having
any choice on how much income to report.
Using A1, we also find that the eﬀective preferred tax rate, t∗(α; y) is increasing in y so
that the higher the agent’s income, the higher the eﬀective rate of taxation he is ready to bear.
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Indeed, an agent with higher income would like to transfer more resources to the old age. Also,
as it is clear from (??), t∗(α; y) is independent of τ . This means that for any tax rate τ > 0, the
agent will always pay his preferred amount of eﬀective taxation t∗(α; y) by adapting exactly how
much he reports, i.e. γ∗(τ,α; y) to a variation in the level of the tax rate. As a consequence,
the flat pension benefit, b(τ,α) = (1− α)τE(y˜)/π = (1− α)E(t∗(α; y)y)/π is simply a residual,
independent of the level of τ . This point will prove to be crucial for determining the voting
equilibrium.
Let us finally make some comparative statics on γ∗(τ,α; y). First, using equation (??), we
show that the rate of compliance is increasing in income, dγ∗(τ,α; y)/dy > 0.13 Indeed, as the
agent becomes richer, both the (first-period) marginal cost of transferring resources to the old
age and its (second-period) marginal benefit decrease; A1 guarantees however that the marginal
cost decreases more rapidly than the marginal benefit so that the agent is willing to transfer
more resources to the second period and γ∗(τ,α; y) increases. Also, using the fact that t∗(α; y)
is independent of τ , we can show that14
dγ∗(τ,α; y)
dτ
< 0.
Hence, a government who would be willing to increase compliance could do it through the
pension system by decreasing the contribution rate (but the total resources collected would not
vary, as shown above). Furthermore, we show in Appendix 6.1 that the variation of γ∗(τ,α; y)
with respect to α is ambiguous and that it depends both on the value of relative risk aversion
and on the elasticity of the pension benefit to the Bismarkian factor, which itself depends on
y. We can only show that, at the two extreme values of α, α = {0; 1}, the preferred level of
compliance, γ∗(τ,α; y) is increasing in α. Also using t = γτ , we show that the reported tax base
E(y˜) is always increasing with α. This will be useful when setting the constitutional value of α.
Finally, using equations (??) or (??), we show that dyˆ(τ,α)/dτ = 0. In words, an increase in
the tax rate does not modify the threshold income after which agents start reporting income.
This is a direct consequence of the flat pension benefit b(τ,α) being independent of the tax
rate. Besides, the eﬀect of α on this threshold is ambiguous: dyˆ(τ,α)/dα ≶ 0. Therefore, in
13We apply the implicit function theorem on (??).
14To see this, recall that
dt∗(α; y)
dτ
= γ∗(τ,α; y) +
dγ∗(τ,α; y)
dτ
τ = 0
which implies that dγ∗(τ,α; y)/dτ < 0.
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the following, we will now denote the threshold below which agents do not report any income
simply by yˆ(α) defined either by equation (??) or (??).
3.2 Preferences over the tax rate and the majority-voting equilibrium
We now study individual preferences over the tax rate and infer the majority-voting equilibrium.
The indirect utility function of an agent with income y takes the following form:
V (τ,α; y) = u((1−γ∗(τ,α; y)τ)y−s∗(τ,α; y))+πu( τ
π
(αγ∗(τ,α; y)y + (1− α)E(y˜))+ ε
π
s∗(τ,α; y))
where γ∗(τ,α; y) ≥ 0 and s∗(τ,α; y) = 0 when α ≥ ε.
The preferred tax rate is such that
∂V (τ,α; y)
∂τ
= γ∗(τ,α; y)y(αu￿(d)− u￿(c)) + (1− α)u￿(d)[E(y˜) + τ dE(y˜)
dτ
] ≤ 0 (11)
with γ∗(τ,α; y) ≥ 0 for y ≥ yˆ(α) and 0 otherwise. Note that the second term in the above
expression is always nil which is a direct consequence of b(τ,α) = (1− α)τE(γ∗(τ,α; y)y)/π or
equivalently of b(τ,α) = (1− α)E(t∗(α; y)y)/π being independent of τ (see previous section).
The first term is also always nil. Indeed, if agents have y ≤ yˆ(α), γ∗(τ,α; y) = 0. These
agents are then indiﬀerent to the tax rate and τ∗(α; y) ∈ [0, 1]. If now agents have y > yˆ(α),
γ∗(τ,α; y) > 0 satisfies (??) so that the first term in (??) also vanishes. However, the diﬀerence
with agents having y ≤ yˆ(α) is that agents with y > yˆ(α) are indiﬀerent to the tax rate as long
as τ∗(α; y) is above τ¯(α; y).15 In such a case, they can always choose γ∗(α; y) ∈ [0, 1] so as to
transfer exactly the amount of resources, τ∗(α; y)γ∗(τ,α; y) > 0 they want for the next period.
If on the contrary, τ∗(α; y) could be below τ¯(α; y), these agents would not be able to transfer as
much resources as they would be willing to since γ∗(τ,α; y) is constrained to be below 1.
Therefore, whatever their income, agents are indiﬀerent to the level of the tax rate as long as
it lies within some boundaries. To understand this indiﬀerence, recall that t∗(α; y) is independent
of τ so that the agent will always adapt γ∗(τ,α; y) to the tax rate level so as to bear the preferred
rate of eﬀective taxation t∗(α; y), accounting for the constraint that γ∗(τ,α; y) ≤ 1.
Let us now study the majority-voting equilibrium. When public pensions are more attractive
than private saving markets, α ≥ ε, all agents are indiﬀerent to the tax rate that serves to finance
the pension system as long as it is above some threshold. There is thus unanimity in favor of
15To see this, evaluate (??) in τ = 0. It is infinitely positive under the assumption that u￿(0) → ∞. In that
case, the FOC on γ, equation (??), is also infinitely positive.
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any strictly positive tax rate such that τV ∈]τ¯(α; ymax), 1] and a pension system emerges. Once
the majority voting tax rate is chosen, agents choose their rate of compliance, depending on
their income level. Those at the bottom of the distribution with y ≤ yˆ(α) choose to report
nothing, γ∗(τV ,α; y) = t∗(τV ,α; y) = 0 as, for them, the marginal utility from first-period
consumption is very high. They only get the Beveridgian part of the pension benefit in the
second period. On the contrary, richer individuals, with y > yˆ(α), choose a positive level of
compliance, γ∗(τV ,α; y) > 0 or equivalently t∗(τV ,α; y) = τV γ∗(τV ,α; y) > 0 which increases
in their income so as to ensure u￿(c) = αu￿(d). Their compliance to the tax system will benefit
the entire population, even agents who did not report any income through the distribution of
the lump sum benefit.
Since agents are indiﬀerent as to the level of taxation and can perfectly adapt the rate of
compliance so as to obtain their most-preferred level of eﬀective tax rate t∗(α; y), they always
obtain, at the majority-voting equilibrium, the maximum utility level, which corresponds to the
level obtained at their preferred allocation (γ∗(τ∗(α; y),α; y), τ∗(α; y)).
Our results are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Whenever α ≥ ε agents prefer public pensions over private savings. In such a
case,
• agents with y ≤ yˆ(α) are indiﬀerent as to the tax rate level, τ∗(α; y) ∈ [0, 1] while agents
with y > yˆ(α) are also indiﬀerent to the tax as long as τ∗(α; y) ∈ [τ¯(α; y), 1]. Indiﬀerence
is a direct consequence of them being able to choose γ∗(τ,α; y) so as to keep the eﬀective
tax rate t∗(α; y) = τ∗(α; y)γ∗(τ,α; y) constant.
• At the majority voting equilibrium, there is unanimity in favor of τV ∈ [τ¯(α; ymax), 1] and
every agent obtains maximum utility.
3.3 Constitutional choice of the level of the Bismarkian factor
As in Section 2, the social planner chooses α that maximizes the utility of the agent with income
ymin. We assume for the moment that the level of the Bismarkian factor is greater than the
return from private savings and check ex post that it is eﬀectively the case. Using our previous
results on individual optimal decisions, γ∗(τ,α; y) (Section 3.1) and the level of the majority
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voting tax rate, τV (Section 3.2), the problem of the social planner consists in solving:
max
α
V (τV ,α; ymin) = u(ymin) + πu(
τV
π
(1− α)E(y˜))
where τV ∈]τ¯(α; ymax), 1] is independent of α and E(y˜) = E(γ∗(τV ,α, y)y). Note that since it
is likely that ymin < yˆ(α), the agent with minimum income does not comply and thus, receives
in the second period only the flat pension benefit, b(τV ,α). Diﬀerentiating this expression with
respect to α, we obtain:
∂V (α; ymin)
∂α
= u￿(d)τV
￿
(1− α)dE(y˜)
dα
− E(y˜)￿ ≤ 0 (12)
First note that ∂V (α; ymin)/∂α|α=0 > 0 and that ∂V (α; ymin)/∂α|α=1 < 0 so that the optimal
α is always interior.16 Using the result shown in Appendix 6.1 that dE(y˜)/dα > 0, we find that
the level of αR is then implicitly defined by:
(1− αR)dE(y˜)
dα
= E(y˜).
Contrary to Casamatta et al. (2000a, b) and to expression (??), equation (??) does not
include the variation of the majority-voting tax rate with respect to α. This a direct consequence
of the indiﬀerence of agents as to the level of τV ; they will always modify γ∗(τV ,α; y) accordingly
to keep t∗(α; y) constant. Therefore, having a positive α is not a way here to ensure a higher
support from richer agents when the system is partly redistributive. Here, the only reason for
a positive α is related to the distortion eﬀect through E(y˜): a higher α increases the tax base
E(y˜) and thus the flat pension benefit part which benefits mostly the least-favored. This eﬀect
is absent under full compliance and is new with regards to the existing literature on the political
economy of pension systems.
Ex post, if the constitutional level of α is eﬀectively greater than the return from private
savings ε, a public pension system with parameters (τV ,αR) emerges. It provides maximum
utility to agents with minimum income.17 If, on the contrary, solving (??) yields that αR
should be smaller than ε, the social planner should arbitrarily choose αR = ε. In such a case,
a pension system emerges and the agent with minimum wage is certainly better-oﬀ than with
private savings. To see this clearly, assume that the agent at the bottom of the distribution
16In order to see that ∂V (α; ymin)/∂α|α=0 > 0, recall that γ∗(τ, 0; y) = 0∀y so that E(y˜) = 0 in (??).
17Recall that agents are indiﬀerent to the level of the tax rate and that, at the majority-voting equilibrium,
they obtain maximum utility for a given α.
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has ymin = 0. In such a case, he would not save and would have a utility level equal to
(1 + π)u(0) while with a pension system, he would obtain u(0) + πu(b(τV ,αR)) and would be
strictly better-oﬀ. This should also be the case if the worst-oﬀ agent has a strictly positive
income; if his reported income is small relative to the average one E(y˜), he would get more from
the Beveridgian part of the pension system than if he was saving on private markets, even if the
marginal return from private savings is higher than that of the public pension.
Before turning to the section with evasion costs, let us finally briefly discuss the situation
where private markets are more attractive than public pensions, α < ε. In that case, agents
prefer to rely on private savings rather than on public pensions so as to transfer income to
the old-age period. They are thus indiﬀerent to the existence of a public pension system and
deciding on τ or α is not relevant as nobody will ever report resources to finance the pension
system.
4 Introducing a cost of evasion
4.1 Individual decisions
Not complying with the tax system generally entails a cost to the agent. This cost can either be
financial, when the agent for instance has to pay lawyers or financial experts to avoid taxation,
or when it takes time (which the agent cannot use for remunerated activities) not to comply. It
could also be psychological when the agent deviates from the moral norm of reporting honestly
income.
To take this feature into account, we assume from now on that an agent with income y has
to incur a cost of evasion which has the following form:18
C(γ, τ ; y) =
1
2
τy(1− γ)2, (13)
This cost is supported in the first period, at the time the agent makes the decision to evade
income and it is increasing and convex in the fraction (1 − γ) of income evaded.19 Note also
that since γ is a function of (τ,α) and y as we show below, total cost of evasion will depend
both directly and indirectly on y and τ but only indirectly on α. Given the form of this cost,
18Here, this cost is paid with certainty. This is diﬀerent from assuming auditing, as in Borck (2004, 2009) and
Traxler (2012) where agents face a probability of being caught and having to pay expensive fines. However, to
keep the problem tractable, they assume quasi-linearity which makes their formulation and ours very close.
19If the cost is psychological, the above function represents the monetary-equivalent of the psychological cost.
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one can rewrite first-period consumption as follows:
c = y(1− γτ)− 1
2
τy(1− γ)2
= y(1− ϕ(γ)τ)
where ϕ(γ) = 12(1 + γ
2) > γ represents the overall cost of taxation to the individual and
ϕ￿(γ) = γ > 0, ϕ￿￿(γ) = 1. For any 0 ≤ τ ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1, c is always positive.
For given pension parameters (τ,α), problem (??) of an agent with income y is now modified
so as to account for the cost of not complying with the tax system, as follows:
max
γ
u(y(1− ϕ(γ)τ)− s) + πu( τ
π
[αγy + (1− α)E(y˜)] + εs
π
) (14)
First order conditions with respect to s and γ are:
∂U
∂s
= −u￿(c) + εu￿(d) ≤ 0 (15)
∂U
∂γ
= yτ [−γu￿(c) + αu￿(d)] ≤ 0. (16)
While the first condition is identical to our original model, the second condition diﬀers by a
term γ which decreases the marginal utility cost of complying with the system. Evaluating (??)
in γ = 0, we obtain that
∂U
∂γ
|γ=0= yταu￿(d) > 0,
so that γ∗(τ,α; y) will always be positive for strictly positive levels of (τ,α). Hence, introducing
a convex cost of evasion like the one in equation (??) guarantees that agents always report some
income. To the contrary, evaluating (??) in s = 0, we cannot rule out the possibility that for
some levels of y, s∗(τ,α; y) = 0. Replacing (??) into (??), we find that this is the case for income
levels such that
α
γ∗(τ,α; y)
> ε. (17)
In words, the marginal return from public pensions (net of the evasion cost) has to be strictly
greater than that of private savings. This relation will be used below.
Therefore, contrary to our previous section, it is now possible to have both partial compliance
and positive savings, independently of the relation between α and ε. This is due first to the
existence of compliance costs which force agents to report income and second, to the fact that
the marginal return from compliance, α/γ, which has to be compared with that of savings ε,
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is now endogenous and depends on the individual’s preferred level of compliance, γ∗(τ,α; y).
Since evasion is costly, every agent wants to report at least a fraction of his income but at the
same time, increased compliance reduces the net marginal return he can obtain from the public
system, making savings more attractive.
In what follows we characterize the individuals’ optimal saving and preferred tax rate. These
decisions depend both on their income and on whether the marginal return from saving is higher
than that of pension. We will first characterize the income range for which individuals do not
save. We show that there exist some income thresholds such that individuals with lower income
have this behavior. We then characterize the behavior of individuals with income above and
below these thresholds. In both cases we will have to consider separately the two possible
relations between α and ε.
Definition of income thresholds.
Let us consider first the case where agents have an income level so that they do not save, i.e.
s∗(τ,α; y) = 0 and (??) is strictly negative. In that situation, they report a positive fraction
of their income, 0 < γ∗(τ,α; y) ≤ min{α/ε; 1} which satisfies (??). Using the implicit function
theorem and assumption A1, it is possible to show that in such a case, γ∗(τ,α; y) is increasing
in y. Hence, this situation where savings are nil corresponds to a situation where the agents’
income is so low that compliance is low and that agents obtain a strictly greater marginal return
from pensions (net of the cost of compliance), i.e. a greater marginal return from complying
than from private savings: αγ∗(τ,α;y) > ε. However, as y increases, α/γ
∗(τ,α; y) decreases until
it becomes equal to ε which enables us to define income thresholds above which agents report
a constant fraction of their income and eventually save. The definition of these thresholds yet
crucially depends on the value of the ratio α/ε as the rate of compliance is constrained to be
below one, as we shall explain now.
Whenever α < ε, we denote y1(τ,α) the income level beyond which agents report a constant
fraction of their income and start saving. It is implicitly defined by20
u￿(y1(1− ϕ(γ∗(τ,α; y1))τ)) = εu￿( τ
π
(αγ∗(τ,α; y1)y1 + (1− α)E(y˜))) (18)
20For ease of notation, we drop the arguments of the function whenever it is clear.
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with γ∗(τ,α; y1) = α/ε < 1 and s∗(τ,α; y1) = 0. In that situation, every agent with y ≤ y1(τ,α)
reports an increasing amount of their income and do not save, while every agent with income
above y1(τ,α) reports a constant fraction of their income, α/ε and makes positive savings. Note
however that if the minimum income ymin in the society is suﬃciently big, no agent is liquidity
constrained (and do not save) so that y1(τ,α) is not relevant.21
When α ≥ ε, γ∗(τ,α; y1) would be higher than one so that we need to define instead two
income thresholds, y2(τ,α) and y3(τ,α). The first one, y2(τ,α) corresponds to the income
threshold at which the rate of compliance becomes just equal to 1, γ∗(τ,α; y2) = 1 and it
satisfies
u￿(y2(1− τ)) = αu￿( τ
π
(αy2 + (1− α)E(y˜))) (19)
with s∗(τ,α; y2) = 0 since at this income level, u￿(c) > εu￿(d). Note that y2(τ,α) is relevant only
if the range of incomes in the population is not too big, i.e. ymin and y¯ are not too diﬀerent.22
As y increases further, first-period marginal utility of consumption, u￿(c) decreases faster than
second-period marginal utility εu￿(d) under assumption A1 so that the two become equal at
some income threshold y3(τ,α) defined by23
u￿(y3(1− τ)) = εu￿( τ
π
(αy3 + (1− α)E(y˜))). (20)
with s∗(τ,α; y3) = 0 and γ∗(τ,α; y3) = 1. Beyond this threshold, agents who already fully
comply eﬀectively start saving.
Individual decisions when y < y1(τ,α) or y2(τ,α)
In that situation, agents do not save and partially comply with γ∗(τ,α; y) defined by (??). As
we already mentioned, the rate of compliance is increasing in y. Moreover, in Appendix 6.2 we
show that, for agents with income below y1(τ,α) or y2(τ,α) (i.e. for those who do not save), the
variation of γ∗(τ,α; y) with τ is negative as long as we are on the increasing part of the Laﬀer
21To see this, replace (??) in (??) and evaluate it in s = 0. It is always non negative if γ∗(τ,α, y) > α/ε. Since
γ∗(τ,α, y) is monotonically increasing in y, this will be the case for suﬃciently high levels of y.
22To see this, evaluate (??) at γ = 1 and y = ymin. If ymin is much lower than y¯, this expression is more likely
to be positive. To the opposite, if ymin → y¯, this expression can be positive or negative.
23Under assumption A1 and using the fact that u￿(c) > εu￿(d) for income levels between y2(τ,α) and y3(τ,α),
one can prove that −u￿(c) + εu￿(d) < 0 increases with y.
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curve.24 In such a case, when the tax rate increases, the marginal cost of complying increases
while its marginal benefit decreases (both the contributive and the flat parts of the pension
benefit are higher) so that agents with y ≤ y1(τ,α) or y2(τ,α) comply less.
Individual decisions when y > y1(τ,α) or y2(τ,α)
Let us now study the decisions of agents whose income is suﬃciently big that they report a
constant fraction of their income. As shown above, this fraction depends on whether α ≷ ε.
Whenever α < ε, agents with income y > y1(τ,α) choose both to save and to partially comply.
Setting (??) and (??) to zero, it is straightforward to see that, for them:
γ∗(τ,α; y) =
α
ε
.
If the rate of return of public pensions is smaller than that of savings, agents always report
a fraction of their income, because it is costly to evade, but not all. In that case, they still
face compliance costs for an amount C(α/ε, τ ; y) = τy(1 − α/ε)2/2 and they set the degree of
compliance so as to equalize the marginal returns from compliance and from savings. In equilib-
rium, the rate of compliance is independent of y and of τ , but it is increasing in the Bismarkian
factor as a higher degree of contributiveness generates a higher return from compliance to the
public system. For any additional dollar above γ∗(τ,α; y1)y1 = αy1/ε these agents would like
to transfer to the second period, they will then use the private saving system (whose marginal
return is now higher). The level of savings s∗(τ,α; y) satisfies
u￿(y(1− ϕ(α
ε
)τ)− s∗) = εu￿( τ
π
(
α2
ε
y + (1− α)E(y˜)) + ε
π
s∗). (21)
Using the implicit function theorem on this condition and the fact that γ∗(τ,α; y) is independent
of y, we obtain that the optimal level of savings, s∗(τ,α; y) is monotonically increasing in y under
assumption A1.
To the opposite, whenever the rate of return from public pensions is strictly greater than that
of private savings (α ≥ ε), agents with income y > y2(τ,α) report all their income, γ∗(τ,α; y) = 1
and face no evasion cost, C(1, τ ; y) = 0. They would even like to report more than γ∗(τ,α; y) = 1
24An increase in τ then unambiguously leads to an increase in resources collected τE(y˜). At the preferred tax
rate of agents with incomes below y1(τ,α) or y2(τ,α), this is eﬀectively the case (see equation ?? hereafter). At
the voting equilibrium, this is also generally the case; only if both α ≥ ε and ym is relatively high, this will not
the case (see Section 4.2.2).
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and αu￿(d) > u￿(c) in that situation. Regarding savings, agents with intermediate income
y2(τ,α) < y ≤ y3(τ,α) are liquidity constrained and choose not to save. In that case, their
income level is such that αu￿(d) > u￿(c) > εu￿(d). Finally, agents at the top of the income
distribution, y > y3(τ,α) complement pension benefits received from full compliance with private
savings. Their preferred level of savings, s∗(τ,α; y) satisfies
u￿(y(1− τ)− s∗) = εu￿( τ
π
(αy + (1− α)E(y˜)) + ε
π
s∗) (22)
and it increases in y. Therefore, when the marginal return from public pensions is higher than
that of private savings, a high-income agent reports all his income and incurs no cost. The only
way for a high-income agent to transfer more resources to the old-age than what is permitted
through the pension system (the compliance rate cannot exceed one) is done through the private
saving market, but this is at the expense of a smaller marginal return.
Our results are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Assume a population of agents with income y ∈ [ymin, ymax] who have the pos-
sibility to save on private markets and to choose the fraction of income they wish to report so
as to finance a public pension system. If evasion is costly,
• When α < ε, there exists an income threshold y1(τ,α) such that
– agents with income y ≤ y1(τ,α) do not save, s∗(τ,α; y) = 0 and they report a positive
fraction of income, 0 < γ∗(τ,α; y) ≤ 1 which satisfies (??). This fraction is increasing
in y.
– Agents with y > y1(τ,α) report a constant fraction of their income, γ∗(τ,α; y) = α/ε
and save a positive amount. For these individuals, saving is defined by (??) and it is
increasing in y.
• When α ≥ ε, there exist two income thresholds y2(τ,α) and y3(τ,α) such that:
– agents with income y ≤ y2(τ,α) do not save, s∗(τ,α; y) = 0 and they report an
increasing fraction of income, 0 < γ∗(τ,α; y) ≤ 1 which satisfies (??). This fraction
is increasing in y.
– agents for whom y satisfies y2(τ,α) < y ≤ y3(τ,α) fully comply but do not save.
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– Agents with y > y3(τ,α) fully comply and save on private markets (s∗(τ,α; y) ≥ 0).
Saving is defined by (??) and it is increasing in income.
Let us finally make two remarks. First, using the facts that γ∗(τ,α; y1) = α/ε and γ∗(τ,α; y2) =
γ∗(τ,α; y3) = 1, we show that under A1, y1(τ,α), y2(τ,α) and y3(τ,α) are increasing in τ . There-
fore, agents start reporting a constant fraction of their income and saving at higher levels of
income for higher levels of τ .25
Second, for y ≤ y1(τ,α) or y2(τ,α), the variation of γ∗(τ,α; y) with α is ambiguous and depends
on whether γ∗(τ,α; y)y ≷ E(y˜) and thus, on the specific value of y. We can only show that
dE(y˜)/dα > 0 (see Appendix 6.2). This last result will prove to be useful when determining the
optimal level of α (Section 4.3).
Having determined the agents’ private decisions, we now turn to studying their preferred tax
rate and the majority-voting equilibrium.
4.2 Preference for the tax rate and the majority-voting equilibrium.
4.2.1 Individuals’ preferred tax rate
The indirect utility function of an agent with income y writes:
V (τ,α; y) = u(y(1− ϕ(γ∗(τ,α; y))τ)− s∗(τ,α; y)) + πu￿ τ
π
[αγ∗(τ,α; y)y + (1− α)E(y˜)] + εs
∗(τ,α; y)
π
￿
where γ∗(τ,α; y) > 0 ∀y and s∗(τ,α; y) ≥ 0 have been characterized in the previous section.
Diﬀerentiating V (τ,α; y) with respect to τ , we obtain
∂V (τ,α; y)
∂τ
= −u￿(c)yϕ(γ∗(τ,α; y))
+ u￿(d)
￿
αγ∗(τ,α; y)y + (1− α)E(y˜) + τ(1− α)dE(y˜)
dτ
￿ ≤ 0 (23)
where we made use of the envelop theorem for γ∗(τ,α; y) and for s∗(τ,α; y).
Case where α < ε
Agents with income y ≤ y1(τ,α) choose s∗(τ,α; y) = 0 and γ∗(τ,α; y) > 0 defined by γ∗(τ,α; y)u￿(c) =
αu￿(d). Evaluating the above FOC in τ = 0, it is straightforward to see that under the assump-
tion that u￿(0)→ +∞, the preferred tax rate level is always interior for these agents. This is not
surprising as for them the pension system constitutes the only way to transfer income toward
25The variation with α is ambiguous, independently of whether α ≷ ε.
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the old age. Replacing for (??) in (??), we obtain after some rearrangements that the preferred
tax rate satisfies
∂V (τ,α; y)
∂τ
= u￿(d)
￿
αy
￿
γ∗(τ,α; y)− ϕ(γ
∗(τ,α; y))
γ∗(τ,α; y)
￿
+ (1− α)(E(y˜) + τ dE(y˜)
dτ
)
￿ ≤ 0 (24)
where γ∗(τ,α; y) − ϕ(γ∗(τ,α; y))/γ∗(τ,α; y) = (γ∗(τ,α; y)2 − 1)/2γ∗(τ,α; y) < 0. The above
expression sums up the marginal utility benefits and costs of increasing the tax rate for an agent
with income y ≤ y1(τ,α). On the one hand, increasing the tax rate makes the agent obtain more
from the pension benefit in the second period, both through the Bismarkian part (αγ∗(τ,α; y)y)
of the pension benefit and through the Beveridgian part ((1−α)(E(y˜)+τ dE(y˜)dτ )) which is positive
on the increasing part of the Laﬀer curve. On the other hand, increasing the tax rate in the first
period is costly as it decreases consumption; this includes both the cost of taxation itself and
the cost of non-compliance which is an increasing function of τ . This marginal cost evaluated
in second-period utility terms is equal to u￿(d)αyϕ(γ∗(τ,α; y))/γ∗(τ,α; y) where we made use of
(??).
Diﬀerentiating the above expression with respect to y, we obtain after some rearrangements
that
∂2V (τ,α; y)
∂τ∂y
=
αu￿(d)
2γ∗(τ,α; y)
￿
γ∗(τ,α; y)2 − 1 + νγ∗,y(γ∗(τ,α; y)2 + 1)
￿
with νγ∗,y = dγ∗(τ,α; y)/dy × y/γ∗(τ,α; y) > 0, the elasticity of compliance with respect to
income. If the value of this elasticity is relatively small, below (1−γ∗(τ,α; y)2)/(1+γ∗(τ,α; y)2),
we find, using the implicit function theorem, that dτ∗(α; y)/dy < 0 while, if the value of the
elasticity is high, it should be positive. Hence, the variation of the preferred value of the tax
rate of agents with income y ≤ y1(τ,α) crucially depends on how responsive the compliance rate
is to income variation. To understand this, note that in (??),
αy
￿
γ∗(τ,α; y)− ϕ(γ
∗(τ,α; y))
γ∗(τ,α; y))
￿
represents the net marginal benefit obtained from direct contributions (evaluated in the second
period) and this is negative, given the existence of compliance costs. Whenever the elasticity
of compliance with respect to income is small, a higher income increases relatively more the
marginal cost of taxation (second term) than its marginal benefit (first term), therefore leading
to a smaller preferred tax rate. To the opposite, if the elasticity of compliance is relatively
high, an increase in income increases relatively more the marginal benefit of taxation than its
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marginal cost and the preferred tax rate thus increases in y. This condition on the size of νγ∗,y
will prove to be crucial for the existence of a voting equilibrium. We come back to this point in
the next section.
When agents have an income y > y1(τ,α), they report a constant fraction of their income
γ∗(τ,α; y) = α/ε and make positive savings which satisfy condition (??). Replacing for this
condition into (??), we obtain:
∂V (τ,α; y)
∂τ
= u￿(d)
￿
αy(γ∗(τ,α; y)− ε
α
ϕ(γ∗(τ,α; y))) + (1− α)(E(y˜) + τ dE(y˜)
dτ
)
￿ ≤ 0 (25)
Again, the above expression represents the marginal benefits and costs of increasing the tax
rate τ for an agent with income y > y1(τ,α). The diﬀerence with the previous case is in the
evaluation of the cost of evasion in the second period, which is now equal to εϕ(γ∗(τ,α; y))y as
(??) is now binding. Replacing for γ∗(τ,α; y) = α/ε,
∂V (τ,α; y)
∂τ
= u￿(d)
￿ y
2ε
(α2 − ε2) + (1− α)(E(y˜) + τ dE(y˜)
dτ
)
￿ ≤ 0 (26)
where the first term is negative. Also, since this expression is strictly decreasing in y, we find
that agents with a suﬃciently high income, beyond some threshold y˙(α) defined by26
y˙(α) =
2ε
ε2 − α2 (1− α)E(γ
∗(0,α, y)y), (27)
prefer a zero tax rate. This is directly related to their opportunity to save on private markets
so as to obtain income for their old age. To the contrary, agents with income y ≤ y˙(α) choose
an interior tax rate such that (??) holds with equality, and making use of the implicit function
theorem, we have that dτ∗(α; y)/dy < 0 ∀y ≤ y˙(α). To understand this, note that as before,
agents are willing to equalize the marginal benefits of increasing taxation with its marginal
cost. But, when y increases, the first-period marginal overall cost of taxation, εϕ(γ∗(τ,α; y))
increases relatively more than its marginal benefit αγ∗(τ,α; y) (through the contributory part
of the pension benefit) so that agents with higher income prefer smaller tax rates. Beyond y˙(α),
they are always net contributors to the pension system so that they even prefer no taxation at
all and to rely exclusively on savings as in such a case the marginal cost of increasing the tax
rate always strictly outweighs its marginal benefit (and (??) is strictly negative ∀τ).
Let us remark that the threshold y˙(α) is relevant only if y1(τ,α) ≤ y˙(α) and if this is the
case, the preference for the tax rate with respect to y is continuous in y1(τ,α).27
26This threshold is obtained by evaluating (??) in τ = 0.
27To see this, note that at y1(τ,α), both (??) and (??) hold with an equality, so that at y1(τ,α), (??) and (??)
are the same.
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Case where α ≥ ε
Agents with income below y2(τ,α) prefer a tax rate level that satisfies (??) and it is decreasing
or increasing in y depending on the value of the elasticity of compliance with respect to income,
as shown above.
Agents with intermediate income, y2(τ,α) < y ≤ y3(τ,α) report all their income, γ∗(τ,α; y) =
1 but do not save on private markets. Since savings are nil, their preferred tax rate is always
strictly positive, under u￿(0)→ +∞. Replacing for γ∗(τ,α; y) = 1, (??) simplifies to28
∂V (τ,α; y)
∂τ
= y[u￿(d)α− u￿(c)] + u￿(d)(1− α)(E(y˜) + τ dE(y˜)
dτ
) ≤ 0 (28)
with αu￿(d) > u￿(c). This condition holds with equality at τ∗(α; y). Using the implicit function
theorem and assumption A1, we find that agents with higher incomes most-prefer higher values
of the tax rate. The intuition for this result is the following. Whenever α ≥ ε, agents with
an income above y2(τ,α) most prefer a higher-than-one value of γ∗(τ,α; y) and would like to
transfer more resources to the future than what they actually can (they already fully comply
and cannot report more than their true income level). The only way to do so is by choosing a
higher tax rate.29 Since agents with a higher income would like to transfer more to the old age,
they prefer a higher tax rate than those with a smaller income.
Finally agents with income above y3(τ,α) fully comply with the tax system and also choose
to save on private markets. Replacing for γ∗(τ,α; y) = 1 and for the FOC on savings in (??),
we obtain
∂V (τ,α; y)
∂τ
= u￿(d)y[α− ε] + u￿(d)(1− α)￿E(y˜) + τ dE(y˜)
dτ
￿ ≤ 0 (29)
This condition holds with equality at τ∗(α; y). Using the implicit function theorem, we obtain
that the preferred tax rate of agents with income y > y3(τ,α) is increasing in income. The
interpretation of this result is identical to that for agents with intermediate incomes. Even
though these agents now save on private markets, the return from the pension system is greater
than that from savings so that they would rather use public pensions than private savings to
transfer income to the old age. Since they already fully comply, the only way to do so is through
a higher tax rate.
28Recall that in this case, the FOC on saving is not binding and that the FOC for γ cannot be used either since
we have constrained γ∗(τ,α; y) to be equal to 1.
29Recall from the previous section that γ and τ are substitutes. Here, because of compliance costs, they are
only imperfect substitutes.
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Let us finally note that, interestingly, when α ≥ ε, every agent with y > y2(τ,α) most-prefers
a value of the tax rate that lies on the decreasing part of the Laﬀer curve (see conditions (??)
and (??)). Although this may seem surprising at first glance, this is in fact a direct consequence
of the rate of compliance being constrained to be at most equal to 1. In such a case, agents would
like to report even more than their true income amount. The only way to get more resources
in the future is therefore to vote for a high tax rate, even if it is at the expense of a smaller tax
base and thus, of a smaller Beveridgian part.
4.2.2 Majority-voting equilibrium
One of the diﬃculties in characterizing the voting equilibrium resides in the fact that whether
agents partially or fully comply with the tax system and whether they save or not (i.e. depending
on whether y ≷ y1(τ,α), y2(τ,α) or y3(τ,α)) shape their preference for the tax rate diﬀerently so
that one cannot use directly the single-crossing condition established by Gans and Smart (1996).
We show (see the Appendix) that for each category of agents, the marginal rates of substi-
tution between τ and b(τ,α) vary monotonically in the same direction and that this variation
is continuous in y1(τ,α) when α < ε (resp. y2(τ,α) and y3(τ,α) when α ≥ ε). However, one
suﬃcient condition for all marginal rates of substitution to vary in the same direction is that
for low-income agents (i.e. with income below y1(τ,α) or y2(τ,α)), the elasticity of compliance
with respect to income, νγ∗,y is small and below (1 − γ∗(τ,α; y)2)/(1 + γ∗(τ,α; y)2) whenever
α < ε, while for α ≥ ε, νγ∗,y should be above (1 − γ∗(τ,α; y)2)/(1 + γ∗(τ,α; y)2). Intuitively,
this means that whenever it is more interesting to rely on the public than on the private sector
(α ≥ ε), agents should comply relatively more as their income increases than when α < ε; this
seems reasonable.
Only in these cases, the marginal rates of substitution between τ and b(τ,α) are all monotoni-
cally increasing (resp. decreasing) in y over the whole [ymin, ymax] interval when α < ε (resp. ≥).
Preferences therefore satisfy the single-crossing property and there exists a unique Condorcet
winner, 0 ≤ τV (α) < 1 which corresponds to the preferred tax rate of the agent with median
income.
The value of τV (α) is likely to depend on whether α ≷ ε. If α < ε, the agent’s preferred tax
rate is everywhere decreasing in income as the elasticity of compliance with respect to income for
low-income agents is assumed to be below (1−γ∗(τ,α; y)2)/(1+γ∗(τ,α; y)2) in that case (for the
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single-crossing condition to be satisfied). If ym ≤ max{y1(τ,α), y˙(α)}, τV (α) > 0 and defined
by either (??) or (??) evaluated in ym, depending on the precise ranking between y1(τ,α), y˙(α)
and ym.30 Note that a positive τV (α) is more likely whenever y1(τ,α) < y˙(α) and that it always
lies on the increasing part of the Laﬀer curve, as it is clear from equations (??) and (??).
To the contrary, if α ≥ ε, the preferred tax rate is everywhere increasing in y as we have
assumed that the elasticity of compliance with respect to income for low-income agents is above
(1−γ∗(τ,α; y)2)/(1+γ∗(τ,α; y)2) in that case. The majority voting tax rate τV (α) is then always
strictly positive and defined either by (??), (??) or (??) depending on the relative position of
ym with respect to y2(τ,α) and y3(τ,α). Interestingly, if ym > y2(τ,α), the majority voting tax
rate always lies on the decreasing part of the Laﬀer curve. A majority of agents will therefore be
in favour of pushing the majority tax rate above the level that maximizes the tax base, simply
because it enables them to transfer resources to the old-age at a higher return, through the
contributory pension benefit part, than with private savings, even if it is at the expense of a
smaller tax base and of a lower flat pension benefit.
Our results are summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 4 Assume a population of agents with income y ∈ [ymin, ymax] who have the pos-
sibility to save on private markets and to choose the fraction of income they wish to report so as
to finance a public pension system. The majority voting equilibrium tax rate, τV (α) is such that
1. If α < ε:
(a) If ym ≤ max{y1(τ,α), y˙(α)}, τV (α) > 0 and
• If ym ≤ y1(τ,α), τV (α) is defined by (??) evaluated in ym,
• If y1(τ,α) < ym ≤ y˙(τ,α), τV (α) is defined by (??) evaluated in ym.
(b) If ym > max{y1(τ,α), y˙(τ,α)}, τV (α) = 0.
2. If α ≥ ε, τV (α) > 0 and
(a) If ym ≤ y2(τ,α), τV (α) is defined by (??) evaluated in ym,
(b) If y2(τ,α) < ym ≤ y3(τ,α), τV (α) is defined by (??) evaluated in ym,
(c) If ym > y3(τ,α), τV (α) is defined by (??) evaluated in ym.
30Recall that the threshold y˙(α) is relevant only if y1(τ,α) < y˙(α).
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This proposition shows how crucial the levels of the marginal returns from pensions and
from savings are for the existence of a pension system. Whenever α < ε, it is possible that
no pension system emerges (if ym is quite high) while for α ≥ ε, there is always a majority in
favour of a pension system. The obvious reason is that in this latter case, the pension system is
more attractive than private savings. Low-income agents choose not to save because they cannot
aﬀord to and rely exclusively on more profitable public pensions. Intermediate- and high-income
agents choose a high tax rate since the return from pensions is more attractive than that from
private savings. They choose therefore to report all their income and do not bear any compliance
cost. Depending on their income level, they will also eventually save on private markets (the
resources they can obtain at old age through the pension benefit are bounded so that the only
way for them to obtain more resources is to invest on the less eﬃcient private saving market).
To the opposite, when α < ε, for high-income agents, the marginal costs of taxation can be
much higher than its marginal benefits, leading them to prefer no pension system at all and to
rely on more attractive private savings (even though they always report a positive fraction of
income since evasion is costly).
Note that in developing countries, ym is likely to be small and α is likely to be greater than ε
(i.e. the private sector is highly ineﬃcient). Hence, for these countries, making agents vote over
the existence of a public pension system would favor the emergence of such system and would
push individuals to report a fraction of their income (or even all of it), since the contributory
part of the pension benefit guarantees that they will receive some resources at a relatively high
return in the second period.
In the next section, whenever α < ε, we will only consider the cases where τV (α) > 0 as this
seems reasonable to assume that ym is relatively low and below y1(τ,α) or y˙(α).
4.3 Constitutional choice of the level of the Bismarkian factor
In this section, we assume that ymin is small and below y1(τ,α) or y2(τ,α) so that this agent
does not save on private markets.31 The problem of the Rawlsian social planner then consists
in solving:
max
0≤α≤1 V (τ
V (α),α; ymin) = u(ymin(1− ϕ(γ∗(τV (α),α; ymin))τV ))
+ πu(
τV (α)
π
(αγ∗(τV (α),α; ymin)ymin + (1− α)E(y˜)))
31Assuming that ymin = 0 simplifies some of the expressions below but does not allow to have clearer results.
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where γ∗(τV (α),α; ymin) is defined by (??) and τV (α) is defined in Proposition 4. The first
order condition of this problem is:
dV (τV (α),α; ymin)
dα
=
∂V (τV (α),α; ymin)
∂α
+
∂V (τV (α),α; ymin)
∂τ
dτV (α)
dα
≤ 0 (30)
where
∂V (τV (α),α; ymin)
∂α
= u￿(d)τV (α)
￿
γ∗(τV (α),α; ymin)ymin − E(y˜) + (1− α)dE(y˜)
dα
￿
represents the direct impact of increasing the Bismarkian factor on the utility of the poorest
agent. If the degree of compliance was exogenous (i.e. all agents reported a fixed fraction of
their income as in the benchmark model), dE(y˜)/dα = 0 and ∂V (τV (α),α; ymin)/∂α would
unambiguously be negative as the tax base of the poorest agent is smaller than the average
one (ymin < y¯). This term accounts for the fact that increasing the degree of contributiveness
implies less redistribution which is to the detriment of low-income agents. This should also be
the case here with endogenous rate of compliance as γ∗(τ,α; y) is an increasing function of y
and thus γ∗(τV ,α; ymin)ymin ≤ E(y˜). This first (redistributive) term therefore pushes toward a
lower level of α. However, when the degree of compliance is endogenous, we have an additional
term which accounts for the eﬀect of α on the size of the tax base, E(y˜). We have shown (see end
of Section 4.1 and Appendix 6.2) that increasing α increases E(y˜) and, thus the uniform benefit
agents receive. This pushes toward a higher α. This eﬀect is not present in standard political
economy models of pension systems (for instance, in models a la Casamatta et al. 2000a,b)
since agents have no other choice than reporting their true income. Therefore, the overall sign
of ∂V (τV (α),α; ymin)/∂α is undetermined.
The second term in (??) accounts for the indirect impact of α on the utility of the poorest
agent, through the majority-voting tax rate. This term was absent from the government problem
when there was no cost of evasion, simply because the majority-voting tax rate was independent
of α. This term represents, here, how the level of the Bismarkian factor aﬀects the support for
the pension system and in turn, the utility of the worst-oﬀ agent at the voting equilibrium. The
expression ∂V (τV (α),α; ymin)/∂τ is equal to (??) evaluated at (τV (α), ymin):
u￿(d)
￿
αymin(γ
∗(τV (α),α; ymin)− ϕ(γ
∗(τV (α),α; ymin))
ϕ￿(γ∗(τV (α),α; ymin))
) + (1− α)(E(y˜) + τV (α)dE(y˜)
dτ
)
￿
.
As shown in Proposition 4, the sign of the above expression depends on whether α ≷ ε. Under
α < ε, the preferred tax rate is decreasing in income so that the worst-oﬀ agent prefers a higher
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tax rate than the median and, this expression evaluated in ymin(< ym) should therefore be
positive. To the opposite, under α ≥ ε, it is negative since the preferred tax rate is increasing
in y.
Finally, finding the sign of dτV (α)/dα proves rather diﬃcult as one would need to fully
diﬀerentiate (??), (??), (??) or (??) depending on the equilibrium considered with respect to α
and to know the sign of d2E(y˜)/dτdα.
To sum up, the above analysis shows that there is a priori no reason to believe that the
pension system chosen at the constitutional level should be fully contributive (αR = 1) or fully
redistributive (αR = 0). It seems reasonable that, with compliance costs, 0 < αR < 1 depending
on the size of the diﬀerent eﬀects described above. At least, it is possible to show that αR > 0
so that the pension system will never be fully Beveridgian.32
In order to have some additional analytical results, we study here an extreme case where
we assume that all agents report a constant fraction of income, either γ∗(τ,α; y) = α/ε or 1 for
all y. In other words, we assume that the thresholds y1(τ,α) (when α < ε) or y2(τ,α) (when
α ≥ ε) are not relevant. In the former case, this would happen if ymin is suﬃciently big while in
the latter case, this would happen if the range of incomes in the population is large (see Section
4.1).
Let us first study the case where α < ε. All agents have γ∗(τ,α; y) = α/ε and thus, the tax
base E(y˜) = αy¯/ε is independent of τ . Using condition (??), we find that the agents’ preferred
tax rate is such that
τ∗(α) = 1 if y <
2(1− α)αy¯
ε2 − α2
= 0 otherwise.
Assuming that ym is below y˙(α) = 2(1−α)αy¯/(ε2−α2), the majority voting tax rate should be
equal to unity.33 Note that since agents do not report all their income, first-period consumption
is strictly positive: c = y(1− α/ε). Replacing for τV = 1 and for γ∗(τV ,α; ymin) = α/ε in (??),
32To see this, suppose instead that α = 0. In such a case, γ∗(τ,α; y) = 0 ∀y so that regardless of the tax
rate, the government does not collect any revenue and is not able to provide any pension benefit. There is thus
no redistribution. Introducing instead α > 0 would be welfare improving as in such a case, it would enable
redistribution and agents with y = ymin would necessarily be better-oﬀ than when α = 0.
33For τV = 0, no pension system emerges and agents are indiﬀerent as to the level of the Bismarkian factor
(expression (??) reduces to 0).
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we obtain after some simplifications that
dV (τV ,α; ymin)
dα
=
∂V (τV (α),α; ymin)
∂α
(31)
=
u￿(d)
ε
[αymin + y¯(1− 2α)] ≤ 0
and thus, that the optimal level of the Bismarkian factor should be interior and equal to
αR = min{ y¯
2y¯ − ymin ; ε},
with y¯/(2y¯ − ymin) < 1. The intuition for this result is that whenever αR < ε, the tax base
is equal to E(y˜) = αy¯/ε so that one needs the Bismarkian factor to be strictly positive so as
to ensure that agents eﬀectively comply. There is thus a trade-oﬀ between making the system
more beneficial to the worst-oﬀ agent (through a lower level of α) and making the system more
profitable (through a higher α which increases the amount reported to fiscal authorities and
thus the flat part of the pension benefit).
Let us then turn to the case where α ≥ ε. In that situation, all agents report all their
income and E(y˜) = y¯ is now independent of α. Using either (??) or (??) depending on the
relative position of ym with respect to y2(τ,α) and y3(τ,α), we find that the median voter
always prefers the maximum tax rate possible and that it is independent of the level of α.34
This result is directly related to the fact that α ≥ ε and that the tax base does not depend on
τ through the level of compliance. Replacing for τV and γ∗(τ,α; ymin) in (??), we obtain after
some rearrangements that
dV (τV (α),α; ymin)
dα
= u￿(d)τV [ymin − y¯] < 0
so that αR should be minimum. Indeed, contrary to the previous situation, the rate of compliance
does not depend on the value of αR: agents fully comply simply because the rate of return from
the pension system is greater than that from private savings and because they are not liquidity
constrained. The government can thus simply set αR = ε to maximize the utility of the worst-oﬀ
without creating any distortion on the fiscal resources collected. This result is however specific
to this case as in our general model, we have shown that the tax base E(y˜) increases in α.
Note finally that in these two latter cases, the majority-voting tax rate is independent of α.
The choice of α therefore does not aﬀect the political support for the pension system, which
allows us to have clear cut results.
34The tax rate is likely to be smaller than one as otherwise, first-period consumption would be null.
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5 Conclusion
In standard models of income taxation, tax authorities observe the individuals’ wage rate or at
least the amount of their earnings. If tax evasion is possible, then an audit technology allows
them to recoup a large chunk of tax revenue. Common knowledge of earnings and eﬀective
tax enforcement are in general characteristics of advanced economies. In many less advanced
economies, informality and self-employment make it more diﬃcult to enforce a workable tax
system, which explains the low level of tax revenue observed there, particularly when the tax
base is individual income. In this paper, we show that even under those circumstances public
resources mobilization is possible and politically sustainable if taxes are at least partially related
to benefits and if the government supplies services for which there are no good substitutes in
private markets. This is precisely the case of retirement saving whose market returns are often
not attractive because of the absence of annuity markets and of the high loading costs of the
financial institutions.
In this paper, we study the political sustainability of a pension system that has three main
features: it is financed by a payroll tax whose base is not observable; it provides benefits that are
partially contributive and the marginal return of those social contributions can be higher than
the financial rate of interest. It appears that in the absence of compliance costs, individuals are
indiﬀerent to the tax rate chosen as they can perfectly adapt their level of compliance. The public
pension system is found to be at least partially contributory in order to increase compliance and
thus to increase the tax base. When compliance costs are introduced, perfect substitutability
between compliance and taxation breaks down. Depending on the relative returns from public
pensions and private savings as well as on the elasticity of compliance to income, we obtain that
the preferred tax rate should be increasing or decreasing in income. The majority voting tax
rate is more likely to be positive when the median income is low and when the return from public
pensions dominates that of private savings. The share of the contributive pension pillar will now
be chosen so as to take into account increased political support, increased direct redistribution
toward the worst-oﬀ, and increased tax base through higher compliance. While reasonable, this
latter reason is however new in the political economy of pension systems literature.
The policy implication of this paper is rather obvious. If one wants to design a sustainable tax
system in developing countries it is important to at least partially link individual contributions
to individual benefits.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Variation of γ∗(τ,α; y) with α without evasion costs.
Fully diﬀerentiating (??) with respect to α and rearranging terms, we obtain that
dγ∗(τ,α; y)
dα
= −u
￿(d) + (ατ/π)u￿￿(d)[γy − E(y˜) + dE(y˜)dα (1− α)]
SOCγ
with SOCγ < 0. Since the sign of the expression inside brackets is ambiguous,
dγ∗(τ,α;y)
dα may
be positive or negative depending on y. Equivalently, since d = P (τ,α; y) when α > ε, one can
rewrite the above expression as follows:
dγ∗(τ,α; y)
dα
= − u
￿(d)
SOCγ
￿
1−Rr(d)∂P (τ,α; y)
∂α
α
P (τ,α; y)
￿
with ∂P (τ,α; y)/∂α = (τ/π)[γy−E(y˜)+ dE(y˜)dα (1−α)] ≶ 0. Evaluating dγ∗(τ,α; y)/dα at α = 0,
it is straightforward to see that it is positive. Evaluating it at α = 1, we obtain that:
dγ∗(τ, 1; y)
dα
= −u
￿(d) + (τ/π)u￿￿(d)[γ(τ, 1; y)y − E(y˜)]
SOCγ
= − u
￿(d)
SOCγ
[1−Rr(d)τ/π(γ(τ, 1; y)y − E(y˜))
d
] > 0
with d = τγ(τ, 1; y)y/π. This is independent of whether γ(τ, 1; y)y − E(y˜) ≷ 0.
Let us also show that one always have dE(y˜)/dα > 0 and dγ∗(τ,α; y)/dα ≷ 0. To do so, we
apply the implicit function theorem on FOC (??) which yields:
∂2U
∂t∂α
= u￿(d) +
α
π
[t∗(α; y)y − E(t∗(α; y)y) + (1− α)dE(t
∗(α; y)y)
dα
]
= u￿(d)
￿
1−Rr(d)
1
π (α(t
∗(α; y)y − E(t∗(α; y)y)) + (1− α)αdE(t∗(α;y)y)dα
d
￿
with d = 1π (αt
∗(α; y)y + (1 − α)E(t∗(α; y)y)). We show this result by contradiction. Assume
that dE(t∗(α; y)y)/dα < 0. If t∗(α; y)y > E(t∗(α; y)y), the fraction inside brackets is smaller
than 1, which yields ∂2U/∂t∂α > 0. If t∗(α; y)y < E(t∗(α; y)y), the expression inside brackets
is positive and ∂2U/∂t∂α > 0. Thus dt∗(α; y)/dα > 0∀y. This leads to dE(t∗(α; y)y)/dα > 0, a
contradiction. Hence, the only possible solution is dE(t∗(α; y)y)/dα ≥ 0 and dt∗(α; y)/dα ≷ 0
depending on the size and the sign of the fraction inside brackets. This implies that dE(y˜)/dα ≥
0 and dγ∗(τ,α; y)/dα ≷ 0.
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6.2 Variation of γ∗(τ,α; y) with τ and α with evasion costs.
When y ≤ y1(τ,α) or y2(τ,α), s∗(τ,α; y) = 0 and γ∗(τ,α; y) > 0 satisfies (??). Diﬀerentiating
this condition with respect to y, we obtain
∂2U
∂γ∂τ
= u￿￿(c)yϕ(γ)ϕ￿(γ) +
α2
π
γyu￿￿(d) +
α(1− α)
π
u￿￿(d)[E(y˜) + τ
dE(y˜)
dτ
].
Assuming that we are on the increasing part of the Laﬀer curve, the last expression inside
brackets is positive, so that the above expression is negative. Using the implicit function theorem,
we conclude that dγ∗(τ,α; y)/dτ < 0.
Let us now make some comparative statics on γ∗(τ,α; y) with respect to α. Diﬀerentiating
(??) with respect to α, we obtain
∂2U
∂γ∂α
= u￿(d) + αu￿￿(d)
τ
π
[γ∗(τ,α; y)y − E(y˜) + (1− α)dE(y˜)
dα
]
= u￿(d)[1−Rr(d)dP (τ,α; y)
dα
α
P (τ,α; y)
]
with d = P (τ,α; y) when y ≤ y1(τ,α) or y2(τ,α). Note also that
dP (τ,α; y)
dα
α
P (τ,α; y)
=
τ
πα(γ
∗(τ,α; y)y − E(y˜) + (1− α)dE(y˜)/dα)
τ
π (αγ
∗(τ,α; y)y + (1− α)E(y˜)) .
Assume first that dE(y˜)/dα < 0. In such a case, if γ∗(τ,α; y)y > E(y˜) for some y, the above
expression is smaller than 1 and ∂
2U
∂γ∂α > 0. If γ
∗(τ,α; y)y ≤ E(y˜) for some other y, the above
expression is negative and ∂
2U
∂γ∂α > 0. This implies that dγ
∗(τ,α; y)/dα > 0∀y and thus that
dE(y˜)/dα > 0, a contradiction. Hence the only possible solution is such that dE(y˜)/dα > 0
and using the implicit function theorem, we find that dγ∗(τ,α; y)/dα ≷ 0 depending on whether
γ∗(τ,α; y)y ≷ E(y˜).
6.3 Single crossing condition with evasion costs
Let us define the intermediate indirect utility function of an agent with income y as
V (τ,α; y) = u(y(1− ϕ(γ∗(τ,α; y))τ)− s∗(τ,α; y)) + πu(εs
∗(τ,α; y)
π
+
τ
π
αγ∗(τ,α; y)y + b)
where b(τ,α) = τπ (1− α)E(y˜). The marginal rate of substitution between τ and b(τ,α) has the
following general form
MRSτ,b =
∂V/∂τ
∂V/∂b
= −−u
￿(c)ϕ(γ∗(τ,α; y))y + αγ∗(τ,α; y)yu￿(d)
πu￿(d)
∀y.
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When α < ε, for agents y ≤ y1(τ,α), it simplifies to
MRSy≤y1τ,b = −
α
2π
y
γ∗(τ,α; y)2 − 1
γ∗(τ,α; y)
> 0
where we replaced for (??) and the functional form of ϕ(γ). Therefore,
∂MRSy≤y1τ,b
∂y
= − α
2πγ∗(τ,α; y)
￿
γ∗(τ,α; y)2 − 1 + (γ∗(τ,α; y)2 + 1)νγ∗,y
￿
(32)
where νγ∗,y =
dγ∗(τ,α;y)
dy
y
γ∗(τ,α;y) > 0. Hence, a suﬃcient condition for the MRSτ,b of every agent
with income y ≤ y1(τ,α) to be monotonically increasing (resp. decreasing) in y is that νγ∗,y is
small (resp. big) and below (resp. above) (1− γ∗(τ,α; y)2)/(1 + γ∗(τ,α; y)2).
For agents with y > y1(τ,α), γ∗(τ,α; y) = α/￿ and s∗(τ,α; y) ≥ 0 satisfies u￿(c) = εu￿(d). In
that case,
MRSy>y1τ,b = −y
α2 − ε2
2πε
> 0
and it monotonically increases in y.
Noticing that at y1(τ,α), MRSy≤y1 = MRSy>y1 , marginal rates of substitution are then
monotonically increasing over the whole interval [ymin, ymax], under the condition that νγ∗,y is
small.
Let us now derive the MRSτ,b when α ≥ ε. For any agent with y ≤ y2(τ,α),
MRSy≤y2τ,b = −
α
2π
y
γ∗(τ,α; y)2 − 1
γ∗(τ,α; y)
> 0
so that, as above, it is decreasing in y for νγ∗,y above (1− γ∗(τ,α; y)2)/(1 + γ∗(τ,α; y)2).
For agents with y2 < y ≤ y3(τ,α), γ∗(τ,α) = 1 and αu￿(d) > u￿(c) > εu￿(d) so that
MRSy2<y≤y3(τ,α)τ,b = −
y
πu￿(d)
[αu￿(d)− u￿(c)] < 0.
Diﬀerentiating this expression with respect to y, we obtain after some rearrangements that
∂MRSτ,b
∂y
= − 1
πu￿(d)
[αu￿(d)(1−Rr(d)ταy/π
d
)−u￿(c)(1−Rr(c))]+ u
￿￿(d)
πu￿(d)2
τ
π
αy(αu￿(d)−u￿(c)).
Under A1, this is always negative.
Finally for agents with y > y3(τ,α), γ∗(τ,α; y) = 1 and u￿(c) = εu￿(d) so that MRSτ,b
simplifies to
MRSy>y3(τ,α)τ,b = −
y(ε− α)
π
< 0
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which is monotonically decreasing in y.
Using the same reasoning as in the previous case, we have that at y2(τ,α), MRS
y≤y2
τ,b =
MRSy2<y≤y3(τ,α)τ,b = 0 and, at y3(τ,α), MRS
y2<y≤y3(τ,α)
τ,b = MRS
y>y3(τ,α)
τ,b . Hence, whenever
α ≥ ε, if νγ∗,y is greater than (1−γ∗(τ,α; y)2)/(1+γ∗(τ,α; y)2), all theMRSτ,b are monotonically
decreasing in y over the whole interval [ymin, ymax].
We can therefore use the single crossing condition established by Gans and Smart (1996)
and the median voter theorem. Preferences are single crossing so that there exists a unique
Condorcet winner which corresponds to the preferred tax rate of the agent with median income.
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